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It is known that a two-person game form g is Nash-solvable if and only if it is tight. We
strengthen the concept of tightness as follows: a game form is called totally tight if each of
its 2×2 subforms is tight. (It is easy to show that in this case all, not only 2×2, subforms are
tight.) We characterize totally tight game forms, and derive from this characterization that
they are tight, Nash-solvable, dominance-solvable, acyclic, and assignable. In particular,
total tightness and acyclicity are equivalent properties of two-person game forms.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
We consider the following six classes of two-person game forms: tight (T ), totally tight (TT ), Nash-solvable (NS),
dominance-solvable (DS), acyclic (AC), and assignable (AS) ones (see Section 2 for definitions and more details) and prove
the following implications:
AS ⇐ TT ⇔ AC ⇒ DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T . (1)
The last three, DS ⇒ NS ⇔ T , were obtained long ago; see, for example, [17–20,10,12,14]. Furthermore, TT ⇐ AC is
obvious; see Section 2.5. Thus, the remaining three implications TT ⇒ AS&DS&AC are the main results of this paper. The
first two of them, TT ⇒ AS&DS, were conjectured by Kukushkin ([18] and private communications), and are proved in the
present paper, while the last one TT ⇒ AC was proved in [18] and independently in [2]. Both proofs are pretty technical
and long, about three pages each. In Section 5, we show that all threemain implications immediately result from a recursive
characterization of the TT game forms obtained in Section 4.
In its turn this characterization is based on the following non-trivial fact: all irreducible TT game forms have the same
effectivity function: Theorem 6 of Section 3.
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Fig. 1. Tight and not tight game forms.
In Section 2, we define the above six classes and also give examples showing that no more implications hold between
them, except for those shown in Diagram (1).
Many of our proofs, concepts, and methods are Boolean. For completeness, we summarize some basic ‘‘Boolean
definitions and facts’’ in Section 6, which can be used as a guide. More details can be found in any Boolean textbook; see, for
example, [6].
2. Game forms: Main definitions and properties
2.1. Game forms and games
A two-person game form is a mapping g : X1 × X2 → A, where X1 (rows) and X2 (columns) are the strategies of players
1 and 2, while A is a set of outcomes. In this paper we restrict ourselves by finite two-person game forms; that is, the above
three sets, X1, X2, and A are finite. Four examples are given in Fig. 1. Furthermore, let u : {1, 2} × A → R be a utility (or
payoff) function. Given a player i ∈ {1, 2} and an outcome a ∈ A, the value u(i, a) is interpreted as the profit of the player i
in case when the outcome a is realized. The pair (g, u) defines a normal form (bimatrix) game. A payoff u is called zero-sum
if u(1, a)+ u(2, a) = 0 for each a ∈ A. In this case (g, u) is amatrix game.
Remark 1. In this paper we restrict ourselves to two-person game forms and their applications in game theory. More
generally, n-person game forms can be viewed as arbitrary discrete functions of several discrete variables and considered
as a part of function theory.
2.2. Nash equilibrium and Nash-solvability
The elements of the direct product X = X1 × X2 are called situations. Given a game (g, u), a situation x = (x1, x2) ∈
X1 × X2 = X is called a Nash equilibrium (NE) if
u(1, g(x1, x2)) ≥ u(1, g(x′1, x2)) ∀x′1 ∈ X1 and u(2, g(x1, x2)) ≥ u(2, g(x1, x′2)) ∀x′2 ∈ X2;
in other words, if no player can profit if the opponent keeps the strategy unchanged.
An NE of a zero-sum game is called a saddle point.
Theorem 2 ([24]). A zero-sum game has a saddle point whenever each of its 2× 2 subgames has one. 
However, in general (for non-zero-sum games), the similar statement does not hold; see, for example, [15] or [1].
A game form g is calledNash-solvable (NS) if for each payoff u the obtained game (g, u) has anNE. Respectively, g is called
zero-sum-solvable if for each zero-sum payoff u the obtained zero-sum game (g, u) has a saddle point.
2.3. Effectivity functions of game forms and criteria of solvability
Given a game form g : X1 × X2 → A, we say that a player i ∈ {1, 2} is effective for a subset of outcomes B ⊆ A if i has
a strategy xi ∈ Xi such that g(xi, x3−i) ∈ B for every strategy x3−i ∈ X3−i of the opponent. In this case we set Ei(B) = 1 and
Ei(B) = 0 otherwise. Thus, two Boolean functions Egi : 2A → {0, 1}, i = 1, 2, are associated with every game form g .
Pair (Eg1 , E
g
2 ) is called the effectivity function (EFF) of g; see [20–22] for more details.
Obviously, the equalities Eg1 (B) = Eg2 (A\B) = 1 hold for no g , since every row and column in X1×X2 intersect. In contrast,
Eg1 (B) = Eg2 (A \ B) = 0 might hold. For example, let us consider game form g in Fig. 1 and set B = {a1} (or B = {a2}). Then
Eg1 (B) = Eg2 (A \ B) = 0, since all rows and columns contain both a1 and a2.
A game form g is called tight if Eg1 (B) = 1⇔ Eg2 (A \ B) = 0, or in other words, if
Eg1 (B)+ Eg2 (A \ B) ≡ 1 ∀B ⊆ A. (2)
For example, game forms g ′, g ′′ and g ′′′ in Fig. 1 are tight, while g is not.
Given a game form g , let us assign to each outcome a ∈ A a Boolean variable and denote it for simplicity by the same
symbol a. Then, the rows and columns of g naturally define two monotone disjunctive normal forms (DNFs) that represent,
respectively, Eg1 and E
g
2 :
Dg1 =
∨
x1∈X1
∧
x2∈X2
g(x1, x2), D
g
2 =
∨
x2∈X2
∧
x1∈X1
g(x1, x2). (3)
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It is not difficult to verify that a game form g is tight if and only if its two DNFs Dg1 and D
g
2 are dual, D
g
1 = (Dg2)d. This
equation is just a reformulation of (2); see Section 6.
For example, for the four game forms g, g ′, g ′′ and g ′′′ in Fig. 1 we have
Dg1 = Dg2 = a1a2; Dg1 6= (Dg2)d = a1 ∨ a2;
Dg
′
1 = a1 ∨ a2a3, Dg
′
2 = a1a2 ∨ a1a3, Dg
′
1 = (Dg
′
2 )
d;
Dg
′′
1 = Dg
′′
2 = (Dg
′′
1 )
d = (Dg ′′2 )d = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1;
Dg
′′′
1 = a1a3a5 ∨ a2a3a5 ∨ a4a5, Dg
′′′
2 = a1a2a4 ∨ a3a4 ∨ a5, Dg
′′′
1 = (Dg
′′′
2 )
d.
Hence, g ′, g ′′, and g ′′′ are tight, while g is not.
Theorem 3 ([12]; see also [14,5]). The following three properties of a game form are equivalent: tightness, Nash-solvability, and
zero-sum-solvability. 
For the zero-sum case this claim was proved earlier by Edmonds and Fulkerson [7] and independently in [11].
Verifying tightness of a game form is an exciting open problem of complexity theory, so-called dualization. No polynomial
algorithm is yet known.However, it is very unlikely that dualization is NP-hard, since there is a quasi-polynomial recognition
algorithm suggested by Fredman and Khachiyan [8]. Its complexity, No(logN) = 2o(log2 N) is rather polynomial, 2c logN , than
exponential, 2cN , where c is a constant and N is the input size.
2.4. Totally tight and irreducible game forms: Main theorem
We will call a game form g totally tight (TT ) if each of its 2× 2 subforms is tight.
Proposition 4. Totally tight game forms are tight.
Proof. Let g be a TT game form and g ′ be its arbitrary 2 × 2 subform. By definition, g ′ is tight and, by Theorem 3, it is
zero-sum-solvable. Then, by Theorem 2, g is zero-sum-solvable and, by Theorem 3 again, g is tight. 
By definition, total tightness of a game form can be verified in polynomial time.
Given a game form g : X1 × X2 → A, a strategy x1 ∈ X1 and the corresponding row (respectively, x2 ∈ X2 and the
corresponding column) are called constant if there is an outcome a ∈ A such that g(x1, x2) ≡ a for all x2 ∈ X2 (respectively,
for all x1 ∈ X1).
A game form g is called reducible if it has a constant line, row or column.
It is easy to verify that a 2× 2 game form is reducible if and only if it is tight.
For example, in Fig. 1, game form g ′ is tight and reducible (its first row is constant), while g is not tight and not reducible.
Let us note, however, that the 3× 3 game form g ′′ is tight but not reducible.
Let us also remark that, by the above definition, an m× n game form is reducible whenever m = 1 or n = 1. Indeed, in
this case each column or, respectively, row is constant. Moreover, formally, even a 1 × 1 game form is reducible, although
there is no game form to reduce it to. By convention, let us say that it is reduced to the empty game form.
By definition, the reducibility of a game form can be verified in linear time.
A game form will be called totally reducible if it can be reduced to the empty one by successive elimination of constant
lines. In [18], these game forms are called semi-dictatorial. For example, g ′ and g ′′′ in Fig. 1 are totally reducible.
Proposition 5. Totally reducible game forms are totally tight.
Proof. The induction bym+ n is obvious. 
More generally, given a game form g , let us eliminate successively its constant lines until we obtain an irreducible game
form g ′ which might be empty or not.
Obviously, g ′ is uniquely defined. Moreover, g ′ is TT if and only if g is TT .
In Section 3, we will prove that all such (non-empty irreducible TT ) game forms have the same effectivity function, the
so-called
(
3
2
)
-majority EFF, E = E
(
3
2
)
defined as follows:
There exist three outcomes a1, a2, a3 ∈ A such that each player i ∈ {1, 2} is effective for any two of them, Ei({a1, a2}) =
Ei({a1, a3}) = Ei({a2, a3}) = 1, and, of course, for each superset of one of these three sets, as well.
Theorem 6. Every non-empty irreducible TT game form g has a
(
3
2
)
-majority effectivity function; that is, there are outcomes
a1, a2, a3 ∈ A such that Eg1 = Eg2 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1.
This result clarifies the structure of a TT game forms. Each such form g is either totally reducible, or it is reduced to an
irreducible form g ′ with a
(
3
2
)
-majority EFF.
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Fig. 2. Adding and eliminating constant lines, rows and/or columns; g is NS (tight) but not DS; g ′ is not tight; g ′′ is assignable but not tight.
Somewhat surprisingly, it is still difficult to characterize the TT game forms explicitly. However, in Section 4 we obtain
a recursive characterization. In Section 5, from this result we derive that TT game forms are (i) acyclic, (ii) dominance-
solvable, and (iii) assignable; see the next three subsections for the definitions. Recently, (i) was proved, while (ii) and (iii)
were conjectured by Kukushkin ([18] and private communications).
Then, results (i) and (ii) were significantly strengthened in [4].
2.5. Acyclic game forms
Given positive integralm, n, and k such that 2 ≤ k ≤ min(m, n), anm× n bimatrix game (g, u), and k distinct strategies
of each player, x11, . . . , x
k
1 ∈ X1 and x12, . . . , xk2 ∈ X2, we say that these strategies form a (strict improvement) cycle if
u(2, g(x11, x
1
2)) < u(2, g(x
1
1, x
2
2)), u(1, g(x
1
1, x
2
2)) < u(1, g(x
2
1, x
2
2)),
u(2, g(x21, x
2
2)) < u(2, g(x
2
1, x
3
2)), . . . ,
u(2, g(xn−11 , x
n−1
2 )) < u(2, g(x
n−1
1 , x
n
2)), u(1, g(x
n−1
1 , x
n
2)) < u(1, g(x
n
1, x
n
2)),
u(2, g(xn1, x
n
2)) < u(2, g(x
n
1, x
1
2)), u(1, g(x
n
1, x
1
2)) < u(1, g(x
1
1, x
1
2));
or in words, if two players alternating can strictly improve their payoffs (k times each), so that they begin and end with the
same pair of strategies (x11, x
1
2).
A game that has no cycles is called acyclic.
It is both obvious and well known that every acyclic game has an NE.
Accordingly, a game form g is called acyclic (AC) if for every payoff u the obtained game (g, u) is acyclic. Obviously, an
acyclic game form is Nash-solvable and, hence, it is tight.
It is an easy exercise to verify that a 2× 2 game form is tight if and only if it is acyclic. Hence, acyclic game forms are TT .
Recently, it was shown that the inverse holds, too.
Proposition 7. A game form is totally tight if and only if it is acyclic.
This claim was shown by Kukushkin [18] and independently in [2]. In Section 5, it will be derived from Theorem 6.
2.6. Dominance-solvable game forms
Given a game (g, u) and two strategies xi, x′i ∈ Xi of a player i ∈ {1, 2}, we say that x′i is dominatedby xi ifu(i, g(xi, x3−i)) ≥
u(i, g(x′i, x3−i)) for every strategy x3−i ∈ X3−i of the opponent; in other words, if player i cannot profit by substituting x′i for
xi if the opponent keeps the same (arbitrary) strategy.
Let us eliminate successively dominated strategies of players. Game (g, u) is called dominance-solvable if this procedure
results in a 1× 1 terminal subgame. The obtained situation is called domination equilibrium (DE). (In the literature, it is also
called sophisticated equilibrium.) It is well known and easy to see that each DE is an NE; see, for example, [19,20] Chapter 5,
or [10].
Although, in general, the result might depend on the order in which dominated strategies are eliminated, there are still
simple conditions under which the above procedure and concept of domination are well defined: namely, when the utility
functions ui : A→ R of both players are injective; in other words, when u(1, a) = u(1, a′) if and only if u(2, a) = u(2, a′)
for all a, a′ ∈ A; see [19,20] Chapter 5, or [10] again.
A game form g is called dominance-solvable (DS) if for any payoff u the obtained game (g, u) is DS. Obviously, DS ⇒ NS,
since, as we already mentioned, each DE is an NE. However, the inverse implication does not hold. For example, game form
g in Fig. 2 is tight and, hence, NS but it is not DS; there is no DE if both players prefer a2 to a1.
Proposition 8. Totally tight game forms are dominance-solvable.
In Section 5, we derive this implication from Theorem 6; see [2] for an independent proof.
To our knowledge, the complexity of verifying if a given game form is DS is open.
2.7. Assignable game forms
Let us call a game form g : X1 × X2 → A assignable (AS) if there are mappings g1 : X1 → A and g2 : X2 → A such that
g(x1, x2) equals g1(x1) or g2(x2) for all x1 ∈ X1, x2 ∈ X2.
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Fig. 3. Game form g is tight and DS but not TT and not AS; tightness and dominance-solvability are not hereditary properties.
Remark 9. Assignability can hardly be interpreted in terms of game theory.
However, it can be naturally interpreted as a type of separability if we view n-person game forms as general discrete
functions of n discrete arguments.
It is easy to verify that all eight game forms in Figs. 1 and 2 and even g ′ in Fig. 3 are assignable, while g is not. The concept
of assignabilitywas suggested by Kukushkin (private communications); he conjectured that the following implication holds.
Proposition 10. Totally tight game forms are assignable.
In Section 5 we will derive this statement from Theorem 6.
It is easy to see that all 2 × 2 game forms, as well as game forms with only two outcomes, are assignable. In particular,
g ′′ in Fig. 2 is AS; however, it is not tight. In contrast, game form g in Fig. 3 is tight and DS but not AS.
Whether a game form g : X1×X2 → A is assignable can be verified in polynomial time, since this problem is polynomially
reduced, for example, to 2-satisfiability. Indeed, let us consider g and two more mappings g1 : X1 → A and g2 : X2 → A.
Given i ∈ I = {1, 2}, a strategy xi ∈ Xi, and an outcome a ∈ A, let us introduce a Boolean variable y = y(xi, a) such that
y = 1 if gi(xi) = a and y = 0 otherwise. Then, let us consider a 2-CNF
C(g) =
∧
a,a′∈A|a6=a′;xi∈Xi,i∈{1,2}
(y¯(xi, a) ∨ y¯(xi, a′))
∧
x1∈X1,x2∈X2,a∈A
(y(x1, a) ∨ y(x2, a)). (4)
CNF C(g) is satisfiable if and only if g is assignable. Indeed, in CNF (4) the first conjunction is equal to 1 if and only if at
most one outcome a ∈ A is assigned by a mapping gi to each strategy xi ∈ Xi, where i ∈ {1, 2}; respectively, the second
conjunction of (4) equals 1 if and only if g(x1, x2) = g1(x1) or g(x1, x2) = g2(x1) for each (x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2.
Let us remark, however, that the above arguments hold only for two-person game forms.
Aswe alreadymentioned, all 2×2 game forms are assignable.Moreover, for 2×2 game forms the following six properties
are equivalent: T , TT , DS, NS, AC , and reducibility.
2.8. Hereditary properties and general remarks
Given a game form g : X1 × X2 → A (respectively, a game (g, u)) and a pair of subsets X ′1 ⊆ X1, X ′2 ⊆ X2, standardly a
subform g ′ of g and subgame (g ′, u) of (g, u) are defined by the restriction of g to X ′1 × X ′2 ⊆ X ′1 × X ′2.
A property P of a game (g, u) (game form g) is called hereditary if P holds for any subgame (g ′, u) of (g, u) (subform g ′
of g) whenever P holds for (g, u) (for g) itself.
By definition, properties TT , AC , and AS are hereditary. In contrast, properties T , NS, and DS can disappear even after
eliminating a constant line, row or column. For example, game form g ′′′ in Fig. 2 isDS; hence, it isNS and tight, too. However,
eliminating its second (constant) row we obtain game form g ′ that has none of these three properties; for example, it is not
tight, since its Boolean functions Eg
′
1 = a1 and Eg
′
2 = a1a2 are not dual.
Relations between the main classes of two-person game forms are summarized by (1).
Let us stress that no other implications hold. Indeed, in Fig. 2, g is tight but notDS, while g ′′ isAS but not tight; furthermore,
g in Fig. 3 is DS but not TT and not AS.
2.9. Adding and eliminating constant lines: A-extensions
Given a game form g : X1× X2 → A, let us define its row A-extension gA1 : XA1 × X2 → A by setting XA1 = X1 ∪ {xa1, a ∈ A}
and gA1 (x
a
1, x2) ≡ a for every x2 ∈ X2 and a ∈ A. In other words, we extend X1 by adding p = |A| constant strategies xa for
all outcomes a ∈ A. For example, in Fig. 2 game form g ′′′ is the row A-extension of g ′′. Similarly, we introduce the column
A-extension gA2 : X1 × XA2 → A of a game form g : X1 × X2 → A.
It is easy to verify that for an arbitrary game form g both its A-extensions are tight, NS, and DS; furthermore, they are TT ,
AC , or AS if and only if g has the corresponding property.
Let us consider three transformations of game forms: A-extension, eliminating and adding a constant line. (For example,
A-extension itself was defined as adding p = |A| constant lines, one for each outcome a ∈ A.)
The followingmeta-languagewill simplify our statements.We say that a propertyP is treated by a transformation T and
consider the three transformations defined above, our standard six properties partitioned in two triplets,X = {T ,NS,DS}
and Y = {TT , AC, AS}, and the following four types of treatment. We apply T to a game form g , obtain a transformed game
form g ′, and say that:
P is encouraged by T if P cannot disappear (but, maybe, it can appear);
P is discouraged by T if P cannot appear (but, maybe, it can disappear);
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Fig. 4. Eliminating and adding constant rows and columns.
P is respected by T if P can neither appear, nor disappear;
P is enforced by T if P cannot disappear and must appear;
P is denied by T if P cannot appear and must disappear.
Theorem 11. (i) Eliminating constant lines discourages properties of X = {T ,NS,DS} and encourages properties of Y =
{TT , AC, AS}; moreover, the latter properties are hereditary;
(ii) Adding constant lines encouragesX and respects Y;
(iii) A-extensions enforceX and respect Y.
Proof. This is tedious, since there are very many cases, but simple.
For example, let us notice that Nash- or dominance-solvability of a game form g cannot disappear after g is extended by
a constant strategy x0i of a player i = 1 or i = 2. Indeed, although x0i might ‘‘kill’’ an NE or DE in the game (g, u), obviously,
in this case, a new one (related to x0i ) must appear in the transformed game.
We leave the analysis of numerous remaining cases to the reader. 
All cases of Theorem 11 are summarized in the two tables given in Fig. 4.
Remark 12. The set of properties X = {T ,NS,DS} can be extended to X′ = {T ,NS,DS, ∃NE, ∃DE}, where the last two
properties are related to games rather than to game forms and mean that a game has an NE or, respectively, DE. If we
substituteX′ forX, the modified Theorem 11 will still hold.
Let us finally note that all above claims extend to the case of n-person game forms.
3. There is a unique irreducible TT Boolean function: Proof of Theorem 6
Let g be a totally tight game form. By Proposition 4, g is tight; that is, the corresponding twomonotone Boolean functions
Eg1 and E
g
2 are dual. However, Theorem 6 claims much more: namely, all TT game forms generate the same self-dual pair:
Eg1 = Eg2 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1.
3.1. Game correspondences and associated game forms
A game correspondence is defined as a mapping G : X1× X2 → 2A. In other words, to each situation (x1, x2) ∈ X1× X2 we
assign a subset of outcomes G(x1, x2) ⊆ A. If |G(x1, x2)| = 1 for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2, then game correspondence G(x1, x2)
becomes a game form.
To a game correspondence G let us assign k = ∏x1∈X1,x2∈X2 |G(x1, x2)| game forms g ∈ G, by choosing for each situation
(x1, x2) ∈ X1 × X2 an outcome g(x1, x2) ∈ G(x1, x2).
Let us notice that k = 0 whenever G(x1, x2) = ∅ for at least one situation.
We will say that g ∈ G is associated with G and call G (totally) tight if k > 0 and at least one g ∈ G is (totally) tight.
3.2. Game correspondences associated with pairs of dual monotone DNFs or Boolean functions
First, let us recall the following twowell-known properties of dualmonotone Boolean functions that will be instrumental
for our analysis.
Lemma 13 (See, Section 6 or [6, Part I, Chapter 4] for more details).
(i) Every two dual implicants α of E and β of Ed have at least one variable in common.
(ii) Given a prime implicant α of E and a variable x of α, there is a prime implicant β of Ed such that x is the only common
variable of α and β . 
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Fig. 5.
(
3
2
)
majority voting game correspondence: from eight game forms associated with this game correspondence only two are TT ; one of them is g ′′
in Fig. 1.
Given two monotone (that is, negation-free) DNFs D1 = ∨x1∈X1 Bx1 and D2 = ∨x2∈X2 Bx2 over the set of variables A, let
us introduce a game correspondence G = GD1,D2 : X1× X2 → 2A by setting G(x1, x2) = Bx1 ∩ Bx2 for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2;
see, for example, GD1,D2 in Fig. 5, where D1 = D2 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1.
Remark 14. For simplicity, we denote by Bxi , i ∈ {1, 2}, the implicants of DNF Di, as well as the corresponding sets of
outcomes Bxi ⊆ A.
Lemma 15 ([14]; see also [23]). If D1 and D2 are dual, then game correspondence GD1,D2 is tight. In particular, in this case
G(x1, x2) 6= ∅ for all x1 ∈ X1 and x2 ∈ X2; moreover, all associated game forms g ∈ G have the same Boolean functions Eg1 and
Eg2 defined by the DNFs D1 and D2, respectively. Conversely, if at least one game form g ∈ GD1,D2 is tight then DNFs D1 and D2 are
dual.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 13(i) and (ii). 
Let us recall that, by definition, G is TT if at least one g ∈ G is TT . However, in contrast with tightness, this does not mean
that all g ∈ G are TT . Let us consider, for example, game correspondence G in Fig. 5. Only two game forms associated with G
are TT (one of them is g ′′ in Fig. 1), while the remaining six are not TT .
Given a DNF D, let D0 denote the corresponding irredundant DNF, that is, disjunction of all prime implicants of D; see
Section 6 for definitions and more details.
Lemma 16. Game correspondence GD1,D2 is TT if and only if GD
0
1,D
0
2 is TT .
Proof. The ‘‘only if’’ part immediately follows, since total tightness is a hereditary property of game forms and game
correspondences. Let us prove the ‘‘if’’ part. By assumption, there is a TT game form g0 ∈ G0 = GD01,D02 . Let us extend it
to a TT game form g ∈ G = GD1,D2 as follows. For i = 1, 2, to each strategy xi ∈ Xi in G assign a strategy x0i ∈ Xi in G0 such
that Bx0i ⊆ Bxi . Then for each situation x = (x1, x2) of G choose the same outcome as for x0 = (x
0
1, x
0
2) in g
0. Obviously, the
obtained extension g of g0 is totally tight, too. 
3.3. Totally tight Boolean functions
Thus, we can restrict ourselves by dual pairs of irredundant DNFs. In other words, keeping inmind the characterization of
TT game forms, we will take as the input a monotone Boolean function E rather than a game form g . Given E, we set E1 = E
and E2 = Ed, consider the corresponding irredundant DNFs D01 and D02 and game correspondence G = GE = GD
0
1,D
0
2 .
We will call E TT if G is TT , or, in other words, if there is a TTg ∈ G. By construction, E is TT if and only if Ed is TT . Let us
consider several examples.
If E = E1 = a1a2 ∨ a3a4 then Ed = E2 = a1a3 ∨ a1a4 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a2a4. It is easy to see that every two prime implicants, α
of E and β of Ed, have exactly one variable in common.
Remark 17. This is a characteristic property of the so-called read-once Boolean functions; see Theorem 29 in Section 6 and
also [6, Chapter 12], for more details.
In other words, game correspondence GE is, in fact, a game form, since |GE(x1, x2)| = 1 for every situation (x1, x2) ∈
X1 × X2. Such a game form g is shown in Fig. 3. However, g is not TT , since it has a 2 × 2 subform g ′ that is not tight; see
Fig. 3.
In general, GE is a game form, GE = gE , if and only if E is read-once; see Corollary 30 in Section 6. It is not difficult to show
that in this case E is TT if and only if gE is totally reducible; see Proposition 5.
Remark 18. This is a characteristic property of so-called monotone totally reducible Boolean functions; see Section 6.5 and
also [6, Part II, Chapter 10] for more details.
However, we are looking for the irreducible TT game forms. As another example, let us consider E = E1 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨
a3a4 and Ed = E2 = a1a3 ∨ a3a2 ∨ a2a4. It is easy to check that GE is not TT , since it contains a 2× 2 subform g ′; see Fig. 6.
A more sophisticated case analysis might be needed for more difficult examples.
Let E = E
(
5
3
)
be the
(
5
3
)
-majority EFF, that is, E = ∨{i,j,k}⊆[5] aiajak, where i, j, and k are pairwise distinct triplets
of [5] = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}; in other words, E = 1 if and only if at least three out of its five variables are equal to 1. Game
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Fig. 6. No TT game form is associated with this game correspondence.
Fig. 7.
(
5
3
)
majority voting, a 4× 4 subcorrespondence; this subcorrespondence is not TT , since no TT game form is associated with it.
Fig. 8. |B \ B′| = 1 or |B′ \ B| = 1.
correspondence GE assigned to E is of size
(
5
3
)
×
(
5
3
)
= 10 × 10. However, to show that GE is not TT it will be sufficient
to consider the 4× 4 subcorrespondence of G given in Fig. 7 (where, to save space, we substitute only the subscript j ∈ [5]
for aj). Let us choose an arbitrary game form g ∈ G. Due to obvious symmetry, we can choose a1 from {a1, a2, a3}, without
any loss of generality. However, in this case G already contains a 2× 2 subconfiguration G′ that is clearly not TT ; see Fig. 7.
Hence, g cannot be TT and, since TT is hereditary, G and GE are not TT , either.
The following lemma is instrumental in characterizing TT Boolean functions.
Given E, let us choose two of its distinct prime implicants and denote by B, B′ ⊆ A the corresponding two sets of variables.
Obviously, B \ B′ 6= ∅ and B′ \ B 6= ∅.
Lemma 19. If E is totally tight, then |B \ B′| = 1 or |B′ \ B| = 1.
Proof. Let us assume indirectly that |B\B′| ≥ 2 and |B′\B| ≥ 2, say, a1, a2 ∈ B\B′ and a3, a4 ∈ B′\B, where a1, a2, a3, a4 ∈ A
are four pairwise distinct outcomes; however, E is TT .
By Lemma 13(ii), there are four prime implicants b1, b2, b3, b4 in Ed whose sets of variables B1, B2, B3, B4 are such that
B1 ∩ B = {a1}, B2 ∩ B = {a2}, B3 ∩ B′ = {a3}, B4 ∩ B′ = {a4}. These four implicants might be not pairwise distinct, but
obviously, b1 6= b2 and b3 6= b4. Hence, two, three, or four of them are pairwise distinct. Let us fix a game form g ∈ GE and
consider the corresponding subform g ′ in g of size 2 × 2, 2 × 3, or 2 × 4. All cases are considered in Fig. 8, where the first
row of each game form is assigned to B and it contains a1 and a2, while the second one is assigned to B′ and it contains a3
and a4.
By assumption, Boolean function E and game correspondence GE are TT .
Let us choose a TT game form g ∈ GE . Then, each subform of g is TT too.
Case 2× 2 is easy, since g ′ itself is not tight; see Fig. 8(1).
In the 2×3 case, by definition of B and B′, we have b 6= a4 and b′ 6= a1. Hence, the 2×2 subformwith entries a2, b, a3, a4
(respectively, a1, a2, b′, a3) is not tight unless b = a2 (respectively, b′ = a3). However, if both these equalities hold then the
remaining 2× 2 subform, with entries a1, b, b′, a4, is not tight; see Fig. 8(2).
Finally, in the 2×4 case, outcomes b1, b2, b3, b4 ∈ A are not necessarily pairwise distinct; however, {b1, b2}∩ {a3, a4} =
{b3, b4} ∩ {a1, a2} = ∅, since b1, b2 ∈ B and b3, b4 ∈ B′; see Fig. 8(3).
Furthermore, b1 = b2 and b3 = b4, since otherwise the first or the last two columns of g ′ form a not tight subform. Let
us set b1 = b2 = b and b3 = b4 = b′; see Fig. 8(4).
However, b (respectively, b′) cannot be equal to both a1 and a2 (respectively, a3 and a4), since they are distinct. Without
loss of generality, let us assume that b 6= a1 and b′ 6= a4; see Fig. 8(5). Then the first and last columns of g ′ form a not tight
subform, even if b = b′.
Thus, in every case, we obtain a contradiction. 
3.4. Irreducible TT Boolean functions are self-dual
There is a simple characterization of reducibility of a game form in Boolean terms.
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Fig. 9. 2-wheel, 3-wheel, and k-wheel.
Lemma 20. Game correspondence GE contains a constant row (column) whose every entry is an outcome a ∈ A if and only if
E = a ∨ E ′ (respectively, Ed = a ∨ E ′′). In both cases, every associated game form g ∈ GE is reducible.
Proof. This follows immediately from the definitions. 
Thus, Theorem 6 can be reformulated as follows: if E is TT then either E = a ∨ E ′, or Ed = a ∨ E ′′, or E = Ed =
a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1. In the first two cases we will call E reducible.
Lemma 21. If E is TT and irreducible then every two of its prime implicants have a variable in common.
Proof. Let us assume indirectly that there are twoprime implicants of Ewith disjoint set of variables B, B′ ⊆ A. By Lemma20,
if E is TT then |B| = 1 or |B′| = 1; in other words, E is reducible and we get a contradiction. 
Lemma 22. If E is TT and irreducible then it is self-dual, E = Ed.
Proof. It is both obvious and well known that E is dual-minor, E ≤ Ed, if and only if every two prime implicants of E have a
common variable; see Lemma 28 in Section 6 or [6] for more details. Hence, by Lemma 21, if E is irreducible and TT then it
is dual-minor, E ≤ Ed.
Furthermore, E is irreducible and TT if and only if Ed is irreducible and TT . To show this, it would suffice just to rename
players 1 and 2. Thus, E and Ed are both dual-minor: E ≤ Ed and Ed ≤ (Ed)d = E. Hence, E = Ed; that is, E is self-dual. 
In Section 4, we will show that only one self-dual function is TT ; all others are not.
For example, let us consider the function associated with the Fano projective plane:
EF = a1a2a3 ∨ a3a4a5 ∨ a5a6a1 ∨ a0a1a4 ∨ a0a2a5 ∨ a0a3a6 ∨ a2a4a6.
It is well known, and not difficult to verify, that EF is self-dual, EF = EdF . However, by Lemma 19, EF is not TT . Indeed, rows{a1, a2, a3}, {a3, a4, a5} and columns {a0, a1, a4}, {a0, a2, a5} form a 2 × 2 game form that is not tight. As another example,
let us recall that the
(
5
3
)
-majority EFF E
(
5
3
)
is self-dual but not TT ; see Fig. 7.
3.5. A 2-wheel is a unique self-dual TT Boolean function
Let us consider one more example. The so-called k-wheel is defined for k ≥ 2 by the formula
Ek = a0a1 ∨ a0a2 ∨ · · · ∨ a0ak ∨ a1a2 · · · ak.
Again, it is well known and easy to check that Ek is self-dual, Ek = Edk for any k ≥ 2. The game correspondences, GEk , are
given in Fig. 9 for k = 2, 3, and in general. (Again, to save space we substitute for an outcome aj only its subscript j.) Let us
fix an arbitrary g ∈ GEk . Due to obvious symmetry, without loss of generality, we can choose ak from {a1, a2, . . . , ak}.
Then a 2× 2 not tight subform g ′ appears in g whenever k ≥ 3; see Fig. 9.
However, as we already know, 2-wheel E2 is TT . There are two TT game forms associated with GE2 ; see Fig. 5 (in which
we substitute i+ 1 for i = 0, 1 and 2).
Furthermore, we can strengthen Lemma 22 as follows.
Lemma 23. If E is TT and irreducible then it is the 2-wheel.
Proof. Let us fix a prime implicant of E with the largest set of variables, which we will denote, without loss of generality,
by B = {a1, . . . , ak} ⊆ A. Since E is irreducible, k ≥ 2.
By Lemma 22, E is self-dual, E = Ed. Then, by Lemma 13(ii), for every j = 1, . . . , k function E contains a prime implicant
with the set of variables Bj such that B ∩ Bj = {aj}. Furthermore, by Lemma 19, |B \ Bj| = 1 or |Bj \ B| = 1.
Let us assume that k ≥ 3. Then |B \ Bj| ≥ 2. Hence, |Bj \ B| = 1; that is, Bj = {aj, bj} for each j = 1, . . . , k. Moreover,
by Lemma 13(i), all bj must coincide; that is, Bj = {a0, aj} for each j = 1, . . . , k. In other words, E is a k-wheel with k ≥ 3.
However, as we already know, in this case Ek is not TT . Hence, k = 2; that is, every prime implicant of E has exactly two
variables; in other words, E = a1a2 ∨ a0a1 ∨ a0a2 is the 2-wheel. 
Thus, all TT irreducible game forms have the same EFF, the 2-wheel. 
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Fig. 10. Canonical partition of irreducible totally tight game forms: Approximation I.
4. Characterizing totally tight game forms
4.1. Canonical partition
Let g be an irreducible TT game form. Then, by Theorem 6, Eg1 = Eg2 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1. In other words, the sets of
rows X1 and columns X2 of g are partitioned into five subsets:
Xi = X12i ∪ X13i ∪ X23i ∪ X123i ∪ X1234i for i ∈ {1, 2}.
The first four sets of lines (rows i = 1 or columns i = 2) consist of outcomes {a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, {a2, a3}, and {a1, a2, a3},
respectively, while each line of X1234i contains an outcome a 6∈ {a1, a2, a3}. Of course, this line must also contain {a1, a2}, or{a1, a3}, or {a2, a3}.
It is important to notice that the first three sets are always non-empty, X12i 6= ∅, X13i 6= ∅, and X23i 6= ∅, while the last
two sets, X123i or X
1234
i or both, might be empty.
4.2. Subform {X121 ∪ X131 ∪ X231 } × {X122 ∪ X132 ∪ X232 }
It is clear that six non-diagonal boxes are filled in accordance with Fig. 10; that is,
g(x1, x2) ≡ a1 whenever (x1 ∈ X121 and x2 ∈ X132 ) or (x1 ∈ X131 and x2 ∈ X122 );
g(x1, x2) ≡ a2 whenever (x1 ∈ X121 and x2 ∈ X232 ) or (x1 ∈ X231 and x2 ∈ X122 );
g(x1, x2) ≡ a3 whenever (x1 ∈ X131 and x2 ∈ X232 ) or (x1 ∈ X231 and x2 ∈ X132 ).
Then, let us consider three diagonal boxes and fix an arbitrary x1 ∈ X131 and x2 ∈ X132 .
Clearly, g(x1, x2) is either a1 or a3. By symmetry, we can assume without any loss of generality that g(x1, x2) = a1. Then,
by total tightness, we successively conclude that
g(x1, x2) ≡ a3 whenever x1 ∈ X231 and x2 ∈ X232 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a2 whenever x1 ∈ X121 and x2 ∈ X122 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a1 whenever x1 ∈ X131 and x2 ∈ X132 .
Thus, we obtain the ‘‘north–west 3× 3 subform’’ in Fig. 10.
4.3. On rows X12341 and columns X
1234
2 : Approximation I
Let us show that g(x1, x2) ≡ a1 whenever x1 ∈ X12341 and x2 ∈ X132 , as in Fig. 11(1).
Obviously, g(x1, x2) is either a1 or a3. Let us assume indirectly that g(x01, x
0
2) = a3 for some x01 ∈ X12341 and x02 ∈ X132 ; see
Fig. 11(2). Then, by total tightness, g(x1, x02) = a1 whenever x1 ∈ X121 ∪ X131 ; furthermore, g(x01, x2) = a2 and g(x01, x2) = a3
must hold simultaneously for any x2 ∈ X232 ; see Fig. 11(2). This contradiction proves our claim.
By the same arguments, we show five similar claims (see Fig. 11) and obtain
g(x1, x2) ≡ a1 whenever x1 ∈ X12341 and x2 ∈ X132 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a2 whenever x1 ∈ X12341 and x2 ∈ X122 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a3 whenever x1 ∈ X12341 and x2 ∈ X232 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a1 whenever x1 ∈ X131 and x2 ∈ X12342 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a2 whenever x1 ∈ X121 and x2 ∈ X12342 ;
g(x1, x2) ≡ a3 whenever x1 ∈ X231 and x2 ∈ X12342 ; see Fig. 10.
Remark 24. In this figure, each line from Z = X12341 ∪ X12342 must contain {a1, a2, a3}, too. For example, no line of Z can
consist of outcomes {a1, a2, a4} or {a2, a3, a4, a7} only.
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Fig. 11. On rows from X12341 and columns from X
1234
2 ; types of contradiction.
Fig. 12. Structure of totally tight game forms: Approximation II.
Furthermore, each line of Z is filled in accordance with the following ‘‘majority rule’’.
Each entry is the (unique) most frequent outcome in the orthogonal line, as in Fig. 10.
Finally,wehave no restrictions for the outcome g(x1, x2)when x1 ∈ X12341 , x2 ∈ X12342 andwehave only trivial restrictions
when x1 ∈ X1231 or x2 ∈ X1232 ; see Fig. 10.
4.4. Further partition of X1231 and X
123
2 : Approximation II
If g(x1, x2) = a3 for some x1 ∈ X1231 and x2 ∈ X132 , then g(x1, x′2) = a2 (respectively, a3) for the same x1 and arbitrary
x′2 ∈ X122 (respectively, x′2 ∈ X232 ); see Fig. 12.
Indeed, we already know that g(x1, x′2) is a1 or a2 (respectively, a2 or a3). Let us assume indirectly that g(x1, x
′
2) = a1
(respectively, a2). Then, for arbitrary x′1 ∈ X121 , rows x1, x′1 and columns x2, x′2 would form a not tight 2 × 2 game form, in
contradiction with TT of g .
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Let subset X31231 ⊆ X1231 be defined by the following property.
For each x1 ∈ X31231 there is an x2 ∈ X132 such that g(x1, x2) = a3; in other words, subform g ′ : X31231 × X132 → A (which
takes only two values a1, a3) has a3 in every row.
Since g is TT , g ′ is TT too; that is, every 2× 2 subform of g ′ has a constant line. In other words, by permutations of rows
and columns, g ′ can be transformed to the ‘‘staircase’’ form defined as follows: (i) in every its row outcomes a3 go first, while
a1 (if any) follow; (ii) in contrast, for each column outcomes a1 (if any) go first, while a3 (if any) follow; see Fig. 12, where,
standardly, we substitute j for aj.
By definition of X31231 , game form g
′ has an a3-column, that is, a column whose each entry is a3. In contrast, a1-columns
might exist or not. The corresponding two cases are denoted in Fig. 12 by the dashed and dotted lines, respectively.
Remark 25. In fact, it is shown in [3] that g ′ contains an a1-column.
By symmetry, applying exactly the same arguments, we obtain two partitions:
X123i = X3123i ∪ X1223i ∪ X1123i ∪ X0123i for rows, (i = 1) and columns (i = 2). (5)
To do so, first, let us substitute i = 2 for i = 1 to define X31232 ⊆ X1232 ; then, introduce subsets X1223i and X1123i for
i ∈ {1, 2}, similarly to X3123i , using the cyclic shift of outcomes: a3 → a2 → a1. Finally, let us define X0123i ⊆ X123i
as the set of rows (i = 1) or columns (i = 2) such that g(xi, x3−i) ≡ a1 (respectively, a2 and a3) for every xi ∈ X0123i
and x3−i ∈ X133−i (respectively, ∈ X123−i and ∈ X233−i). Obviously, each line of X123i belongs to exactly one of the four subsets
{X1123i , X1223i , X3123i , X0123i }. The two partitions
Xi = X12i ∪ X13i ∪ X23i ∪ X3123i ∪ X1223i ∪ X1123i ∪ X0123i ∪ X1234i (6)
obtained for rows (i = 1) and columns (i = 2) are given in Fig. 12.
Let us remark that the last five sets might be empty, while the first three cannot be.
We remark also that the next six subforms have pairwise disjoint sets of rows and columns:
X1123i × X123−i, X1223i × X233−i, X3123i × X133−i; where i = 1, 2.
Hence, we can bring them simultaneously to the ‘‘staircase’’ form shown in Fig. 12.
4.5. From Approximation II to Approximation III
In fact, Approximation II in Fig. 12 can be extended to Approximation III in Fig. 13.
Such an extension is based solely on the total tightness of g , and all proofs are similar to the proofs of the previous four
subsections. However, the complete case analysis is pretty long and, to save space, we refer the reader to preprint [3].
It is important to notice that the two diagonal 3× 3 subtables in Fig. 13 are equal.
Let us also repeat that all rows (columns) of g are partitioned into eight subsets such that the first three are not empty,
while each one of the last five might be empty or not.
4.6. General recursion: Approximation IV
In their turn, sets X0123i can be partitioned in exactly the same way as X
123
i for i ∈ {1, 2}, etc. General recursion requires
k rounds of such partitions; Figs. 13 and 14 represent cases k = 2 and k = 3, respectively. In fact, Fig. 14 can be used to
represent the general case, as well. Again, it is important to notice the following.
(i) By assumption, the original game form g is TT and irreducible, while the reduced one g ′ is TT but not necessarily
irreducible; that is, it might contain constant lines. Similar reduction can be applied to g ′. We start with successive
elimination of all constant lines from g ′ (if any) to obtain an irreducible TT game form g ′′. Then we decompose g ′′ in the
same way, according to Fig. 14, etc. Such decomposition is based on some triplet of outcomesA′ = {a′1, a′2, a′3} which
might coincide with or differ from the original tripletA = {a1, a2, a3}.
(ii) Each row and each column of g ′ contain an outcome a distinct from a1, a2, and a3.
In particular, if g ′ is irreducible, or in other words, g ′ = g ′′, thenA′ 6= A.
(iii) Each 2× 2-extension of every entry of g ′ is reducible, or, equivalently, tight.
(iv) All diagonal 3× 3 subtables in Fig. 14 are equal.
(v) In partitions of Xi, i ∈ {1, 2}, the first three sets are not empty, while every other set might be empty or not.
(vi) All ‘‘staircase’’ subforms are brought to this shape simultaneously, that is, by the same permutations of rows X1 and
columns X2 of g . Let us also notice that the first two such subforms have slightly more special structure than the others;
see Fig. 14.
(vii) Again, for the complete case analysis, we refer to preprint [3].
5. Totally tight game forms are dominance-solvable, acyclic, and assignable
We will show that all three implications easily result from the recursion of Section 5.
Let us recall that, by definition, TT , AC , AS are hereditary properties, while DS is not.
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Fig. 13. Structure of a totally tight game form: Approximation III contains Approximation I as a subtable.
5.1. Proof of Proposition 8, TT ⇒ DS
Let us assume indirectly that a TT game form g is not DS. Then there is a payoff (or preference profile) u such that
game (g, u) is not DS. Let us eliminate successively dominated strategies from (g, u) in an arbitrary order until we obtain
a domination-free subgame (g ′, u). Game form g ′ is TT , since g was TT . However, g ′ might be reducible. In this case, let us
successively eliminate constant lines from g ′ until we obtain a (unique) irreducible g ′′.
Clearly, game (g ′′, u) is still domination-free, since elimination of a constant line respects this property. Since g ′′ is TT
and irreducible, it must be of type given in Fig. 13, Approximation III. Let us recall that sets of rows X12i , X
13
i , and X
23
i are not
empty for i = 1, 2.
It is not difficult to verify that if a1 (respectively, a2 or a3) is the worst outcome for player 1 among {a1, a2, a3} then every
row from X131 (respectively, from X
12
1 or X
23
1 ) is dominated by each row of X
23
1 (respectively, of X
13
1 or X
12
1 ); see Fig. 13. Thus,
game (g ′′, u) is not domination-free and we obtain a contradiction. 
5.2. Proof of Proposition 7, TT ⇒ AC
Given a TT game form g ′, assume indirectly that it is not acyclic; i.e., there is a payoff (or preference profile) u such that
game (g ′, u) has a strict improvement n-cycle Cn. Obviously. the corresponding n × n subform g is TT , too. Moreover, in
every line, row or column, of g there is exactly one arc of Cn. Since no constant line can contain such an arc, we conclude
that g is irreducible. Furthermore, being TT and irreducible, g is of type given in Fig. 13.
First, let us show that each player i ∈ {1, 2} has a strict preference between any two outcomes from A = {a1, a2, a3}.
Indeed, every row (column) from X12i ∪X13i ∪X23i contains exactly two outcomes: {a1, a2}, {a1, a3}, and {a2, a3}, respectively.
Hence, if u(i, aj′) = u(i, aj′′) for two distinct j′, j′′ ∈ {1, 2, 3} then g contains a constant line. This is a contradiction, since g
is irreducible.
Let us consider chain of strict inequalities: u(1, a1) < u(1, a3) < u(1, a2) < u(1, a1).
By transitivity, at least one of them fails. By symmetry, we can assume, without any loss of generality, that u(1, a1) >
u(1, a3). Let us prove that then u(2, a3) > u(2, a2).
Assume indirectly that u(2, a3) < u(2, a2). Each column of X132 contains a unique arc of Cn. This arc goes from a1 to
a3 and this a3 is either in X231 or in X
3123
1 ; see Fig. 13. Where can the next arc of Cn lead to? If a3 is in X
3123
1 then it can
lead only to a1 in a column of X132 again. This column also contain a unique arc of Cn that can lead only to a3, etc. Thus,
sooner or later, cycle Cn will come to a3 in X231 . Then the next arc can only lead to a2. Thus, we proved the implication:
u(1, a1) > u(1, a3)⇒ u(2, a3) > u(2, a2).
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Fig. 14. Approximation IV and general recursion.
By symmetry, we derive the following chain of six similar inequalities:
u(1, a1) > u(1, a3)⇒ u(2, a3) > u(2, a2)⇒ u(1, a2) > u(1, a1)
⇒ u(2, a1) > u(2, a3)⇒ u(1, a3) > u(1, a2)⇒ u(2, a2) > u(2, a1),
where odd and even ones contradict the transitivity of u(1, ∗) and u(2, ∗), respectively. 
5.3. Proof of Proposition 10, TT ⇒ AS
Let us remark that our proofs for acyclicity and dominance-solvability of a TT game form were based on Approximation
III in Fig. 13, while to derive assignability we will need the more advanced Approximation IV in Fig. 14. However, the proof
itself is simpler.
Let us assume indirectly that TT but not AS game forms exist. Let g be a minimal one. By minimality, g is irreducible.
Hence, g can be decomposed in accordance with Fig. 14, in which g ′ is a TT subform of g . Moreover, g ′ is AS, since g is a
minimal TT but not AS game form. However, every assignment for g ′ can be easily extended to g as follows: let us assign aj
to each strategy xkji , where j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, i ∈ {1, 2}, and k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. Thus, g is AS, which is a contradiction. 
6. Boolean appendix
6.1. Disjunction, conjunction, negation, and duality
A Boolean function is a binary function of several binary variables, that is, a mapping F : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}. Let
x = (x1, . . . , xn) be the vector of variables. Standardly, x′ ≤ x′′ means that x′i ≤ x′′i for all i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}.
Function F(x) = F(x1, . . . , xn) is calledmonotone if F(x′) ≤ F(x′′)whenever x′ ≤ x′′.
Remark 26. A monotone Boolean function F(x1, . . . , xn) can be viewed as an n-person game form in which each player
i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n} has two strategies, xi = 0 or xi = 1, and there are only two outcomes, A = {0, 1}. However, in the present
paper, the set of variables were interpreted as the set of outcomes A = {a1, . . . , ap} of a game form.
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By definition, the disjunction F = F ′∨ F ′′ (conjunction F = F ′∧ F ′′) is equal to 1 if and only if both F ′ and F ′′ (respectively,
F ′ or F ′′) are equal to 1; furthermore, the negation F(x) is equal to 1 if and only if F(x) = 0. By definition, F ∧ F ≡ 0 and
F ∨ F ≡ 1.
The dual function to F = F(x1, . . . , xn) is introduced by the formula F d = F(x1, . . . , xn).
Then, it is not difficult to verify the following de Morgan rules:
F ′ ∧ F ′′ = F ′ ∨ F ′′, F ′ ∨ F ′′ = F ′ ∧ F ′′;
(F ′ ∧ F ′′)d = (F ′)d ∨ (F ′′)d, (F ′ ∨ F ′′)d = (F ′)d ∧ (F ′′)d.
Furthermore, negation and duality are involutions; that is, (F d)d = F and F = F for all F .
6.2. Disjunctive and conjunctive normal forms
Given binary variables x and δ, a literal xδ is defined as x when δ = 0 and x when δ = 1. These two literals are called
positive and negative, respectively.
An elementary conjunction (disjunction) is a conjunction (disjunction) of several literals α = xδ11 , · · · , xδ`` (respectively,
β = xδ11 ∨ · · · ∨ xδ`` ).
A DNF D is the disjunction of elementary conjunctions D = ∨ki=1 αi, while a CNF C is the conjunction of elementary
disjunctions C =∧ki=1 βi.
A CNF C (DNF D) is satisfiable if C(x) = 1 (respectively, D(x) = 0) for some x. Verifying satisfiability of a CNF or DNF is an
NP-complete problem; see, for example, [9].
An elementary conjunction α (disjunction β) is called an implicant (implicate) of F if F ⇒ α, i.e., α = 1 whenever F = 1
(respectively, if F ⇐ β; i.e., F = 1 whenever β = 1).
Each DNF D =∨ki=1 αi (CNF C =∧ki=1 βi) defines a Boolean function F .
Obviously, in this case all αi are implicants of F , while all βj are implicates of F .
Conversely, each Boolean function can be represented by a DNF, as well as by a CNF.
6.3. Monotone DNFs, CNFs, and their duality
A DNF or CNF with only positive literals (without negations) is calledmonotone.
Obviously, both definemonotone Boolean functions. Conversely, each monotone Boolean function can be represented by
a monotone DNF, as well as by a monotone CNF.
From now on, let us restrict ourselves by monotone functions represented by monotone DNFs. Let F be represented by
D = ∨ki=1 αi. Then, all αi are implicants of F .
For simplicity, let us denote the set of variables of implicant α by the same symbol, α.
Distinct DNFs might represent the same Boolean function: F = ∨ki=1 α′i = ∨`j=1 α′′j .
Clearly, in this case, for each α′i there is an α
′′
j such that α
′
i ⊇ α′′j and vice versa.
An implicant α of F is called prime if strict containment α ⊃ α′ holds for no implicant α′ of F . Obviously, every function
F is the disjunction of all its prime implicants.
The corresponding DNF D0 = D0(F) is called irredundant.
It is also clear that the dual function F d is monotone if and only if F is monotone.
We extend Lemma 13 as follows and prove it to make the paper self-contained.
Lemma 27 (See, for example, [6], Part I, Chapter 4).
(i) Every two dual implicants α of F and β of F d have at least one variable in common.
(i′) β is an implicant of F d if and only if β has a common variable with each (prime) implicant of F .
(ii) Given a prime implicant α of F and a variable x of α, there is a prime implicant β of F d such that x is the only common
variable of α and β .
Proof. By definition, negating all variables of F d we obtain F . Since F ∧ F ≡ 0, (i) follows.
Furthermore, recalling that F ∨ F ≡ 1, we strengthen (i) to (i′).
To show (ii), let us assume indirectly that every (prime) implicant β which contains x also contains another variable of
α. Then α is not prime, since, by (i′), α \ {x} is also (the set of variables) of an implicant of F . We get a contradiction, since α
is prime, by assumption. 
A Boolean function F is called dual-minor, dual-major, or self-dual if F ≤ F d, F ≥ Fd, or F = F d, respectively.
Lemma 28 (See, for example, [6], Part I, Chapter 4). Function F is dual-minor if and only if each pair of its (prime) implicants has
a common variable.
Proof. By Lemma 27(ii), every two (prime) implicants of F have a common variable if and only if each implicant of F is an
implicant of F d; that is, F ≤ F d. 
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6.4. Read-once functions and tight rectangular game forms
A (monotone) Boolean function F and the corresponding irredundant DNF D = D0(F) are called read-once if F can be
expressed via its variables by a (∨,∧)-formula in which each variable appears exactly once.
For example, F1 = a1a3∨a1a4∨a2a3∨a2a4 and F2 = a1a3a5∨a2a3a5∨a4a5 are read-once, since F1 = (a1∨a2)(a3∨a4)
and F2 = ((a1 ∨ a2)a3 ∨ a4)a5, while F3 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a1 and F4 = a1a2 ∨ a2a3 ∨ a3a4 are not read-once.
Clearly, F d is read-once if and only if F is read-once. For example, F d1 = a1a2 ∨ a3a4 and F d2 = (a1a2 ∨ a3)a4 ∨ a5 are
read-once, while F d3 = F3 and F d4 = a1a3 ∨ a3a2 ∨ a2a4 are not.
Theorem 29 ([13]; see also [16]). Function F is read-once if and only if each pair of prime implicants α of F and β of F d have
exactly one common variable, |α ∩ β| = 1. 
It easily seen that the right-hand-side condition holds for F1 and F2 and fails F3 and F4.
A game form g is called rectangular if g(x1, x2) = g(x′1, x′2) = a implies that g(x1, x′2) = g(x′1, x2) = a. Obviously,
Theorem 29 can be reformulated, in two ways, as follows.
Corollary 30. A game form g is tight and rectangular if and only if Eg1 and E
g
2 form a read-once dual pair. Furthermore, game
correspondence GD1,D2 is a tight (and rectangular) game form if and only if DNFs D1 and D2 form a dual read-once irredundant
pair. 
Let us remark that if GD1,D2 is a game form then this game form is rectangular.
6.5. Totally reducible functions and game forms
A function F is called reducible if F = x∨ F ′ or F = x∧ F ′, where F ′ does not depend on x. Furthermore, F is called totally
reducible (TR) if it can be successively reduced to F0 ≡ x (and after this to F ′0 ≡ 0 or F ′0 ≡ 1). From this definition, it is easy
to derive that:
(i) TR functions are read-once, but not vice versa;
(ii) a read-once function F is TR if and only if the parentheses are pairwise nested in a read-once expression of F ;
(iii) function F is TR if and only if F d is TR;
(iv) if game form g is TR then it is tight and (Eg1 , E
g
2 ) form a TR dual pair;
(v) conversely, a game correspondence GD1,D2 is a TR game form whenever (D1,D2) is a dual TR pair of irredundant DNFs.
Let us recall the read-once functions F1 and F2 fromSection 6.4 and game form g ′′′ in Fig. 1. It is easy to verify that F2 = Eg ′′′1
and F d2 = Eg
′′′
2 . Hence, functions F2, F
d
2 and game form g
′′′ are TR. In contrast, read-once functions F1 and F d1 are not TR.
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